Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios

Qian，Jun1; Sun，Xiao1; Zhang，Tongda2; Chai，Yueting1

2022-09-01

10.3390/e24091289

Entropy   Impact Factor & Quartile

1099-4300

Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals’ gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models.

central punishment collaboration evolutionary game theory peer punishment risk-resistant model

SCI

English

Corresponding

National Key R&D Program of China[2021YFF0900800]

Physics

Physics, Multidisciplinary

WOS:000857660900001

MDPI

2-s2.0-85138514273

Scopus

1.National Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies,Department of Automation,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China
2.Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen,518055,China

Qian，Jun,Sun，Xiao,Zhang，Tongda,et al. Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios[J]. Entropy,2022,24(9).

Qian，Jun,Sun，Xiao,Zhang，Tongda,&Chai，Yueting.(2022).Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy,24(9).

Qian，Jun,et al."Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios".Entropy 24.9(2022).