Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios
|Corresponding Author||Sun，Xiao; Zhang，Tongda|
Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals’ gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models.
National Key R&D Program of China[2021YFF0900800]
|WOS Research Area|
|WOS Accession No|
Cited Times [WOS]:1
|Document Type||Journal Article|
|Department||Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering|
1.National Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies,Department of Automation,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China
2.Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen,518055,China
|Corresponding Author Affilication||Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering|
Qian，Jun,Sun，Xiao,Zhang，Tongda,et al. Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios[J]. Entropy,2022,24(9).
Qian，Jun,Sun，Xiao,Zhang，Tongda,&Chai，Yueting.(2022).Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy,24(9).
Qian，Jun,et al."Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios".Entropy 24.9(2022).
|Files in This Item:||There are no files associated with this item.|
|Recommend this item|
|Export to Endnote|
|Export to Excel|
|Export to Csv|
|Similar articles in Google Scholar|
|Similar articles in Baidu Scholar|
|Similar articles in Bing Scholar|
Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.