The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
Peer punishment is a crucial determinant in the formation of cooperation between individuals. Previous studies show that prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors coexist in societies as the two sides of peer punishment. Surprisingly, people show saliently different antisocial punishment behaviors across regions, while prosocial punishment behaviors remain consistent. This raises a crucial question: why do prosocial and antisocial punishments exhibit completely different characteristics across regions? We answer this question by presenting a two-stage evolutionary model of people's peer punishment preference. We show that different central powers lead to discrepancies between people's antisocial and prosocial punishment behaviors. Moreover, we find that central power determines evolutionary outcomes by influencing the proportion between three basic individual types of a population. Our model provides a possible explanation for cross-regional variations in antisocial punishment behavior and a new interpretation of social norms. More generally, it sheds light on a potential theory to unify the evolution of people's coexisting prosocial and antisocial interactions.
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Cited Times [WOS]:0
|Document Type||Journal Article|
|Department||Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering|
1.National Engineering Laboratory for E-commerce Technologies,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China
2.Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen,518055,China
3.Key Laboratory of Contemporary Design and Integrated Manufacturing Technology,Ministry of Education,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an,710072,China
4.Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an,710072,China
Qian，Jun,Zhang，Tongda,Zhang，Yingfeng,et al. The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors[J]. APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION,2023,442.
Qian，Jun,Zhang，Tongda,Zhang，Yingfeng,Chai，Yueting,Sun，Xiao,&Wang，Zhen.(2023).The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors.APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION,442.
Qian，Jun,et al."The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors".APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION 442(2023).
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